On the stable marriage polytope  by Ratier, Guillaume
DISCRETE 
MATHEMATICS 
ELSEVIER Discrete Mathematics 148 (1996) 141-159 
On the stable marriage polytope 
Guillaume Ratier 
Laboratoire d'Economktrie d l'Ecole Polytechnique, Universit~ de Paris 1 Panthbon-Sorbonne, 
1 rue Descartes, F-75005 Paris, France 
Received 17 May 1994 
Abstract 
The stable marriage problem is a game theoretic model introduced by Gale and Shapley 
(1962). It involves two sets of players referred to as men and women. A marriage is a set of 
disjoint pairs, where each pair consists of a woman and a man. Each individual has a strict 
linear order of preference over the set of opposite sex. A marriage is called stable if there is no 
man and woman who both prefer being matched to each other over the outcome they obtained 
in the marriage. 
Conway showed 'that the set of stable marriages can be ordered as a lattice. Vande Vate 
(1989) described the polytope whose extreme points are the set of stable marriages. Rothblum 
simplified and extended this result. 
In this paper the marriage problem is reformulated in terms of a marriage market graph. A 
stable marriage is characterized as a kernel of the graph. Equivalent marriage graphs are those 
having the same sets of stable marriages, and it is shown how a "simplest" such graph can be 
obtained. The faces of the polytope are characterized in terms of the lattice of stable marriages. 
I .  Introduction 
1.1. Definition of a marriage market 
Definition 1. A marriage market is a triple, Ma = {M; W; P}, where 
(1) M is a set of men, M = {ml;...;mlMi}, 
(2) W is a set of women, W = {wL;...;Wlwl} , and 
(3) P is a set of lists P = {P(x)/x E M U W} with the following condition: 
I fx  E M then P(x) is of the form (Wl;... ;w,~;x), and i fx  E W then P(x) is of the 
form (ml ; . . .  ;mnx;x). 
P(m) represents he strict linear order of preferences of men m over the set of women 
W. If w precedes w ~ in P(m), then m prefers marrying w to w ~. The absence of w in 
P(m) means that m prefers being single to being married to w. The standard notation 
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">m" will be used: 
P(m) = (wl; w2; • .. ; wk; m) 
¢:~ wl >m W2 >m "'" >m m >m (all other women). 
The same interpretation is given to P(w) and is written ">w".  
Definition 2. The pair (x, y) is acceptable if x E P(y)  and y E P(x). 
Remark. The pair (x,x) is acceptable for all x in M U W. 
Definition 3. A marriage of Ma = {M; W; P} is a function p such that : 
(1 )#:MUW-- - -~MUW 
x,  , ~(x). 
(2) ~, o ~ = Id. 
(3) If  x #/ f ix )  then x and/ f ix)  are of opposite sex. 
(4) For all x, (#(x),x) is acceptable. 
If #(m) = w, then/~ is said to realize the pair (re, w). 
Gale and Shapley defined a marriage to be "stable" if there exist no man and woman 
who prefer each other to their corresponding mates, that is, if/~ is stable, there can be 
no pair with : 
m E M and w E W such that /~(m) <m w and #(w) <w m. 
Therefore, the following definition is clearly equivalent o the first. 
Definition 4. A marriage, /~, of Ma, is stable if and only if 
#(m) ~ w =:~ (/~(m) >,n w or ~(w) >w m). 
Thus,/~ is stable if (m, w) not realized implies that at least one of the two is better-off 
in #. 
Result 1. (Gale and Shapley [4]). Every marriage market admits a stable marriage. 
They gave a constructive proof. 
1.2. Orders over the marriages 
Result 2. (Conway [3]). I f  p and p' are two stable marriages of a market, then 
/t(m) = w <m /~'(m) ~ /~(w) = m >w #'(w). 
Thus, i fm is better-off in /d  than in/~, his woman in/~ is worse-off in #'. "/t >M/ t  1'' 
means that all men like g as well as g~ and at least one man prefers/~ to #' outright. 
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Definition 5. 
It >g I t  ! 
¢:~ Vm E M, It(m)>..-mIt'(m) and 3m0 E M such that It(m0) >m0 It'(m0). 
Similarly define "> w": 
It >wi t  ~ 
¢* Vw E W, It(w)>lwIt'(w) and 3wo 6 W such that It(wo) >wo It'(wo). 
By result 2 : 
(St >M It') '~ (St' >w It). 
(1) 
(2) 
Result 3. (Conway [3]). 
(1) The set of stable marriages of a market is a distributive lattice under the order 
of men ">~t". 
(2) If # and Itl are two stable marriages, their upper bound, # V ItP, is defined by 
#(m)>~m#'(m) ~ It V It'(m) --- It(m). 
Furthermore, their lower bound, It A Its, is defined by 
It(m)<<.mIt'(m) ~ ItAIt'(m) = It(m). 
The unique M-optimal marriage, denoted ItM, is the upper bound of the stable 
marriages for ">~t" and the unique W-optimal marriage, denoted Itrv, is the lower 
bound. Itw is the best stable marriage for women, and It~t the worst. 
1.3. The stable marriage polytope 
A marriage, #, can be represented by a matrix X ~ = (XUmw) of zeros and ones such 
that "XUmw = 1" if It realizes (m,w). Each stable marriage is one element of the vector 
space of the matrix with IMI lines and IWI columns. We are interested in the stable 
marriage polytope which is defined to be the convex hull of the stable marriages. 
Result 4. (Vande Vate-Rothblum-Roth). If A is the set of acceptable pairs, the stable 
marriage polytope is defined by 
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Z Xmj <~ 1 Vm E M (I[m]), 
j ew 
~-~ Xiw <<. 1 Vw E W (I[w]), 
iEM 
g Xmw>---O V(m,w) CA (II[m,w]), 
Xmw ~--- 0 V(m,w) ~ A (II[m,w]), 
Xmw+ ~-~Xiw+ ~Xmj>~l V(m,w) EA (III[m,w]). 
i>wm j>n~w 
The extreme points of this polytope are precisely the stable marriages. 
The inequations (I [m]) and (II[w]) express that each marries at most once. III [m, w] 
is the condition for stability: if (m, w) is not realized then Xwm = 0 and, by Definition 
4, at least one of the Xmj or the xiw must be equal to one. 
2. Marriage graphs 
2.1. Basic notions of graph theory 
The graphs considered in this paper are oriented. 
A graph G, sometimes denoted G(S, U), is defined by the set of its vertices S and 
the set of its edges U, with each edge an ordered pair of vertices. 
Let G(S, U) be a graph and s a vertex of G. s ~ is a successor of s if and only if 
(s,s') ~ U. 
Let s be a vertex of the graph G. Fa(s) is the set of successors of s. A graph G 
can be defined by the set of its vertices S and the correspondence FG (denoted by 
G(S, Fa)). 
Let G(S, Fa) be a graph. The subgraph of G spanned by S', a subset of S, is the 
graph H(S', FH ) where FH(s) = Fa(s) fq S'. 
N C S is a kernel of the graph G(S, Fa) if and only if 
(1) for all s C N, Fa(s) MN = 0 (condition denoted KC1) and 
(2) for all s E S \ N, Fa(s) f3 N ~ O (condition denoted KC2). 
A circuit is a graph, G(S, Fa), where S = {so ..... sn-l } and Fa(Sirnodn) = {S(i+Omodn }. 
2.2. Definitions 
Definition 6. Given a marriage market Ma = {M; W; P}, the associated oriented mar- 
riage graph, GMa, is defined as follows: 
(1) the vertices tow correspond to the acceptable pairs (re, w); and 
(2) the edges are the ordered pairs of vertices (Stow, Sm'w') satisfying: 
(m t = m and w <m W') or (W' = w and m <w m'). 
The edges express the preference orders. 
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Example. Consider six men and six 
P(ml)  : w3,wl,ml; 
P(m2) = w4, w2, m2; 
P(m3 ) : Wh W2, W3, W4, m3; 
P(m4) = w2, W4, Ws, m4; 
P(ms) = ws, w6, ms; 
e(m6) = W6, W5, m6; 
women with the following orders: 
P(Wl) : ml,m3,wl; 
P(w2) : m2,m3,m4,w2; 
P(w3) : m3,ml,w3; 
P(w4) : m4,m3,m2,w4; 
P(ws) = m6,ms, m4,ws; 
P(w6) = m5,m6,w6. 
The edges implied by the transitivity of the order " <m0 " are edges (Snow,Snow, , )  
obtained from the existence of a woman w', and edges (Snow, Snow' ) and (Snow', Snow") 
in the graph until no further edges can be obtained. In all the figures the edges coming 
from the transitivity of the orders " <m " and " <w " are absent. Fig. 1 depicts the 
associated graph of this market. Line i represents man mi, column j woman wj. 
Such a graph contains all of  the information of the marriage market, so it is sufficient 
to work only with it. That is what we will do. It realizes the vertex, Snw, of GMa means  
it realizes the pair (re, w). 
Lemma 1. (Mafrey [5]). Let Ma be a marriage market and GMa its associated mar- 
riage #raph. It is a stable marriage of Ma if and only if the set of its realized vertices 
is a kernel of GMa. 
Proof .  Let R be the set of realized vertices of the stable marriage #. 
(a) Two vertices belong to an edge if and only if an individual is present in the two 
corresponding couples. So, It is a marriage is the same as R verifying condition KC1. 
(b) The set of couples corresponding to the successors of Snw are (m; w') and (m'; w) 
such that 
m ~ >w m and w ~ >m W. 
So R verifying condition KC2 is the same as # being stable by Definition 4. [] 
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Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 3. 
2.3. Equivalent graphs 
Definition 7. Stow is maximal-man if and only if there is no edge of the form 
(Stow, Stow' ). 
Stow is maximal-man if w is the first choice of m. In the example of Fig. 1, 
sin,w3 is maximal-man. Define similarly the vertices maximal-woman, minimal-man and 
minimal-woman. They correspond to the first and the last choices of each individual. 
There can also be vertices (max-woman)/(min-man) or (max-man)/(min-woman). 
Fig. 2 depicts them. 
The marriage graph may be simplified. There sometimes exist vertices which are 
never realized by any stable marriage. It is possible to remove such a vertex if the 
set of stable marriages does not change. Removing a vertex of GMa is equivalent to 
considering that the corresponding pair is not acceptable. 
Definition 8. Two marriage graphs are equivalent if and only if they have the same 
set of stable marriages. 
Lemma 2. Let G be any marriage graph and suppose mo E M and Wo, wl E W 
satisfy: 
(1) Smowo is max-woman; 
(2) Smow0 is a successor Of Smow,. 
Then the subgraph of G obtained by removing Smow~ is equivalent o G. 
The two conditions of this lemma are equivalent to 
(1) Vm E M different from m0, m0 > wo m (that is, m0 is the first choice of w0), and 
(2) w0 >,no wl (mo prefers w0 to Wl). 
Fig. 3 describes the situation. 
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Proof. We call H the simplified graph. Let # be any stable marriage of G. 
(a) #(m0) ¢ wl. m0 is the first choice of w0, so the set of all successors of Smowo is 
{Smow/W >m0 W0}. If #(m0) = Wl then by KC1, no element of this set can be realized 
but, then, this contradicts KC2 for the vertex Smowo. 
(b) We know that every vertex realized by a stable marriage /~ is in H. So, # is a 
marriage in H and it is only necessary to show that # is stable in H. But, KC2 holds 
for every vertex of G, so it also holds for those of H. 
(c) Finally, a stable marriage for H is stable for G. 
We only have to see that Smow~ has a realized successor, because the other vertices 
are in H and # is stable in H. Whereas Fc,(Smowo) C FG(Smow, ) and Smowo has a realized 
successor. Therefore p is stable for G. [] 
Remark. Symmetrically, if too, ml and wo satisfy : 
W0 > m0 W, ~W ~ W 0 and  m0 > w0 m l. 
Then it is possible to remove Sworn,. 
2.4. Principal graphs 
Definition 9. A subgraph, C, of the marriage graph G is a principal circuit of G if 
and only if it satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) If C has an edge which represents a preference of an individual, all the edges 
representing the preferences of this individual are edges of C. 
(2) If the edges implied by the transitivity of the orders " <m " and the orders 
" <w " are dropped, then C is a circuit. 
An individual is said to be associated with the principal circuit C, if all the edges 
representing the preferences of this individual are edges of C. 
The set of individuals associated with C is of the form: 
(mo;wo;ml;wl; ...... ;mn;wn;mn+l) with: 
- -  mo = mn+l. 
- -  Vi s .... is a vertex of type (max-man)/(min-woman). 
- -  Vi Sm,+,w, is a vertex of type (max-woman)/(min-man). 
Fig. 4 gives an example of a principal circuit, with the gray vertices those of type 
mardmin. 
Lemma 3. Every marriage graph is equivalent o a marriage graph consisting only 
of principal circuits. 
Consider the example of Fig. 1. There is no principal circuit. Lemma 2 permits 
the removal first of the vertex Sm3w4, because of Sm3w3 which is max-woman, then the 
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removal of Sm, ws, because of Sm4w4 which is max-woman. So, the graph of Fig. 1 is 
equivalent to the graph to Fig. 5 . 
In this graph, there are three principal circuits : 
C1 with associated individuals mbm3,wl,w3, and vertices Sm~w~,Sm~w3,Sm3w3,Sm3w:, 
Sm3wl ;
(?2 with associated individuals m2.m4,wE.w4, and vertices s,~2w2,Sm2~4,S~4w..Sm4w 2, 
Sin3 w2 ; 
C3 with associated individuals ms, m6, ws, w6, and vertices Sm~w~, s 6~5, S~wo, S~sws. 
Notice that each individual is associated with only one circuit, that one individual 
can be present in a vertex of a principal circuit without being associated with it, and 
that the associated individuals of a principal circuit are those who are present in its 
max/min vertices. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider a marriage graph G. If all the maximal vertices are 
max/rain vertices, then it is clearly formed only by principal circuits. Suppose G con- 
tained a vertex max s that is not max/min. Then, Lemma 2 permits vertices to be 
removed until s becomes max/rain. So there exists an equivalent graph iri which all 
the max-man vertices are min-woman and all the max-woman vertices are min-man 
(see example above). [] 
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Definition 10. A marriage graph is said to be a principal marriage graph if and only 
if it is formed only by principal circuits. 
In the sequel only principal marriage graphs will be considered. 
Lemma 4. f f  G is a principal marriage graph, then #M realizes the vertices (max- 
man)/(min-woman) and #w realizes the vertices (max-woman)/(min-man). 
Remark. Lemmas 3 and 4 give an algorithm to obtain the stable marriages #M and 
/~w: Given a marriage graph G, 
while some vertex max is not max/min do 
remove vertices as in Lemma 2; 
#M ---- {the max-man/min-woman vertices}, Pw = {the max-woman/min-man 
vertices}. 
2.5. Subgraphs generated by two stable marriages 
Definition 11. Let //1,122 be two stable marriages of the graph G (not necessarily 
principal), and ~t+ = (#1 V #2) and #_ = (#l A #2) their upper and lower bound. 
G(#1,1~2) is the sub.graph of G spanned by the set of vertices Stow satisfying: 
ll_(m)<.mW~m#+(m ) and i~+(w)<.wm<.w#_(w). 
Remark. G(#1,#2) = G(#I A #2,#1 V #2) = G(p_,p+). 
Lemma 5. G(#_, p+ ) is a principal marriage graph. 
Proof. The maximal-man vertices are those realized by #+, and Result 2 shows that 
they are minimal-woman. The maximal-woman vertices are those that are realized by 
/~_, and again Result 2 shows that they are minimal-man. [] 
Lemma 6. The stable marriages of G(I~+, p- )  are the stable marriages I~ in G sat- 
isfying: 
Proof. By Definition 11, a stable marriage of G contained between #_ and p+ is a 
stable marriage of G(#_, #+). 
To see the converse, suppose p is a stable marriage of G(#_,/2+). It is, of course, 
a marriage of G. Using Lemma 1 to show the stability, it must be proved that any 
vertex Smowo f G is either ealized by/~ or has a successor realized by #. The different 
positions of Smow~ in G are examined. 
(a) Smowo is a vertex of G(#_,p+). 
p is stable in G(/2_, p+), so the result is immediate. 
(b) Smowo is not a vertex of G(#_,p+). 
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By Definition 11, one of the four following conditions is true: 
w0 <rag/t-(m0),#+(m0) <,no wo,mo <w0 #+(wo) or/t_(w0) <wo m0. 
The stability of/~+ with KC2 for Smowo shows that the second condition implies the 
fourth, and similarly with #_, the third implies the first. So, one of the two following 
conditions holds: 
Wo <rag/~-(m0) <mo ]/+(m0) or mo <wo p+(w0) <wo/~-(w0). 
In the first case, the successors of Smo~,_(mo) in G(/L,/~+) are successors of Smowo in G 
(see Fig. 6). 
By the stability of/~ in G(/~_,p+), Smou_(mo) has a successor realized by kt or it is 
itself realized, so it is also true for Smowo. In the second case, the proof is the same 
with the roles of w0 and m0 interchanged. [] 
Remark. G(I.IM, PW ) is a principal graph equivalent to G. 
2.6. Example 
Fig. 7 depicts the set of stable marriages of the example given in Fig. 
Fig. 8 gives the lattice of stable marriages for the same example. 
1, and 
3. Connected components of the graph 
If a marriage graph has two connected components, then the marriage market is 
equivalent to two independent markets. More formally, 
Lemma 7. I f  G has n connected components GI, ..., Gn, then for all L Gi is a marriage 
graph. 
l f  l~ is a marriage in G such that for all i, iti6 ~, its restriction to Gi is stable, then 
is a stable marriage in G. 
I f  it is a stable marriage in G then for all i, ~16~ is stable in Gi . 
The example of Fig. 7 illustrates this lemma. The proof is immediate. 
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Lenuna 8. Let p+ and p_ be two comparable stable marriages (#+ >M P-) .  
G(#+,Iz-) has one connected component containing more than one vertex if and 
only if  there is no pair of  stable marriages different from #+ and #_ such that their 
upper and lower bounds are #+ and #_. 
152 G.Ratier/Discrete Mathematics 148 (1996) 141-159 
p2(m) w #1(m) 
A 
m ~\ \ \x~\  E 
,~(w) 
x\\,,\x~\\'~ edges of C 1 
edges of C2 
Fig. 9. 
Proof. Suppose G(#+,#_) has at least two connected components containing more 
than one vertex, and let two such be Gl and G2. Let/~l and #2 be defined as follows: 
(#1)10, = (#+)IG,, (#1)102 = (#-)IG2, and #fire) = #_(m) for all the other men. 
(#2)IG~ = (#-)IG,, (#2)IG~ = (#+)lOs, and #2(m) = #+(m) for all the other men. 
Clearly/~l V/~2 = #+ and #1 A #z = #- .  So the condition is necessary. 
Suppose G(#+, #_ ) has one connected component not reduced to one vertex and that 
there are two stable marriages #] and/~2 other than/~+ and/~_ satisfying #1 V #2 = #+ 
and/~1 A #2 =/L .  Result 3 shows that #1 and #2 realize together the same vertices 
as #+ and/~_. Moreover, if #](m) = #+(m) then/z2(m) = #_(m) and vice versa. If a 
stable marriage realizes only max/min vertices in a principal circuit, it realizes all the 
max-man/min-woman or all the max-woman/min-man vertices. 
Let ~]  be the set of principal circuits of G(#+, #_) where #1 and #+ realize the 
same vertices (the max-man/min-woman). I  these circuits/~2 = #- .  Let C#~z be the 
set of principal circuits of G(#+, #_)  where #2 --- #+ and #1 = #- .  
Neither of these sets is empty by assumption. We are in a connected component so 
there is a vertex Stow which is in C] an element of ~] ,  and in C2 an element of T~2. 
If m is associated with C1 then w is associated with C2 and there is an instability as 
can be seen in Fig. 9 (S,,w has no successor realized by P2); else w is associated with 
C1 and m with C2 and similarly there is an instability of #1. [] 
4. Stable marriages of a same face 
4.1. Equations of the polytope 
Lemma 3 permits a reformulation of the marriage polytope in terms of the principal 
marriage graph. 
If S,,w is minimal-man then III[m,w] is ~--~dewx,,j>>. 1. 
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So, I[m] and III[m,w] can be replaced by one identity, similarly for II[w] and 
III[m,w], so the equations of the polytope are 
f ZX,n j  = 1 Vm if there exists a vertex Smj (I[m]), l jEW 
I ZX iw -- 1 Vw if there exists a vertex Siw (I[w]), 
~t ~ iEM 
| X~w >>.0 Vsmw a vertex of the graph (II[m,w]), 
I Xmw = 0 Vsmw not a vertex of the graph (II[m,w]), 
Xmw + Z Xm'w' >1 1 Vsmw a vertex that is not maximal (III[m,w]). 
sin,., E F(sm. )
4.2. Characterization of the faces 
Definition 12. A face is a set of extreme points of the polytope which all saturate the 
inequalities of a given set of inequalities of the polytope. 
F = {/~1 ..... #p} is a face if and only if there exists a set of inequalities Se such 
that: 
# saturates all the inequalities of Se is equivalent to # E F. 
The marriage graph is principal, so the inequalities which can be saturated are 
(II[m,w]) if Smw is a vetrex of the graph and (III[m,w]) VS~w a vertex that is not 
maximal. 
An inequality (II[m,w]) is saturated by/~ if and only if/~ does not realize the vertex 
Smw. An inequality (Ill[m, w]) is saturated by # if and only if/~ realizes a unique vertex 
of {Stow } U Fo(smw) (condition denoted SA T(III[m, w])). An inequality (Ill[m, w]) is not 
saturated by /t if and only if/~ realizes two vertices of Fa(s,nw) (condition denoted 
NSAT(III[m,w])). 
Lemma 9. I f  two incomparable stable marriages #l and /~2, saturate an inequality 
(E) of the polytope, then t~1 A #2 = I~- and #1 V P2 = I~+ do also. 
Proof. If (E) = (II[m,w]) then Result 3 shows this lemma. So the proof is given for 
/~+ and (E )= (III[m,w]). 
#1 and /~2 satisfy SAT(III[m,w]). Then S,W~(,n ), Smu2(m), Su,(w)w and Sm(w)w are suc- 
cessors of Stow. SU+(,n)m E {Smlq(m),Sm#2(m) } and su+(w)w E {su~(w)w,S~,2tw)w } (see Fig. 10 
which proves the lemma). [] 
Definition 13. Let #+ and #_ be two comparable marriages (/~_ <M /~+) and 
{GI .. . . .  G,} the set of connected components of G(/~+, #_ ). The associated hypercube 
H(#+, #_ ) is the set of stable marriages/~ whose restrictions to the Gi are (/~+)lc, or 
(~-)tG,. 
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This set is a hypercube for the order “<MI’. To see this let Gi,. . . , G, be the 
connected components of G(p+, p_ ), and denote each marriage of H(p+, ,u- ) by pj,,,,,j” 
with : 
jk = 1 ifPj,,...,j, = PL+ in Gk and jk = 0 ifpj ,,__., j. = p_ in Gk. 
Then /Lj ,,,,, h <M /Lji ,,,, Ji if and only if jk < jl for all k. 
Remark. H(,u+, p_) is not the set of stable marriages of G(p+,p_). Nor is it the set 
of stable marriages of G@+, p_) which realize only min/max vertices. This may be 
seen in Fig. 7 : H(p1, ~5) = (~1, ,u~g} and ~3 is a stable marriage which realizes only 
min/max vertices of G(pi , p, ). 
Lemma 10. If p+ and p- are two comparable stable marriages (,u- <M p+) that 
saturate (E), an inequality of the polytope, then all ,u E H(p+,p_) do also. 
Proof. As in the previous lemma, the proof is obvious if (E) = (II[m,w]). For an 
inequality of form (E) = (III[m,w]), two cases are examined. 
Case 1: s,, is a vertex of Gi, a connected component of G(p+, p_). Suppose that 
(p)lo, = (v+)lo,. The vertices realized in {smw} U rG(smw) by p and p+ are all in Gi. 
Therefore, p and ,u+ realise the same vertices in {smW} U rG(s,,). So, SAT(III[m, w]) 
is equivalent for ~1 and for p+. The same proof with (,u)~o, = (p-)IG, shows that 
SAT(III[m,w]) is equivalent for p and for p_. 
Case 2: s,, is not a vertex of G(p+, +_). Suppose that 
w <In P-(m)<&+(m). 
p+ and p- satisfy SAT(III[m,w]), so s~+(~)~ and s~_(,,,),+ are not successors of s,,. 
Fig. 11 depicts the situation. 
p_ cM ~1 cM II+, so in the set r&,W), ~1 realises only Sag, and this satisfies 
SAT(III[m, w]). 
If w cm p__(m)~~p+(m) is not satisfied then m <W p+(m)<,,,p_(w) and the same 
proof with w and m interchanged yields the same result. 0 
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Lemma 11. H(#+, #_) is a face. 
Fig. 11. 
Proof. Let # be a stable marriage not in H(#+, #_). In view of the previous lemma, 
it suffices to prove that there exists an inequality saturated by all the elements of 
H(#+, #_) but not by #. 
If there is a man m such that #(m) ¢ {#+(m),#_(m)}, then (II[m,#(m)]) gives the 
result. So, it may be assumed that 
Vm E M, #(m) E {#+(m),#_(m)}. 
There exists Gi, a connected component of G(#_, #+), such that (#)16, is different from 
(#+)1~, and (#-)la,, by definition of H(#+,#_)  and #. If a stable marriage realizes 
only max/min vertices in a principal circuit, it realizes all the max-men/min-women or 
all the max-women/min-men. 
Let ~g~+ be the set of principal circuits of Gi for which # and #+ realize the same 
vertices (the max-men/min-women). 
Let ~_  be the set of principal circuits of Gi for which # and #_ realize the same 
vertices (the max-women/min-men). 
These two sets are not empty, otherwise (#)la, = (#+)16, or (#-)16,. Gi is connected 
so there is a vertex Stow which is in C+ an element of cg~+, and in C_ an element 
of cg~_ (see Fig. 12). The end of the proof is the same as Lemma 8: #+ and #_ 
saturate (III[rn, w]) but not #. [] 
Theorem 1. A set of stable marriages, F, is a face of the stable marriage polytope 
if and only if it satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) For every pair of incomparable marriages #l, #2 of F, the marriages #1 A #2 = 
#_ and #1 V #2 = #+ are also in F. 
(2) For every pair of comparable marriages #_, #+ of F, H(#+, #_ ) C F. 
Proof. Lemmas 10 and 11 show that the two conditions are necessarry. The conditions 
are proved to be sufficient by contradiction: suppose that F satisfies the two conditions, 
that # is a stable marriage not in F and that # saturates all the inequalities that all 
elements of F saturate. 
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Fig. 12. 
Condition (1) implies that F is a distributive lattice for " >g ". p is a stable 
marriage of the subgraph generated by the lower and upper bounds of F. Let #+ be 
the lower bound of the elements of F which are above #, and p_ the upper bound of 
the elements of F which are below p (/t_ <M ~ <g P+ and Vp ~ E F if/~ <g P~ 
then p+ ~M]A ! and if p' <M ]2 then p' ~<~MIA_). 
(a) For all m, #(m) E {/~_(ra),#+(m)}. 
Otherwise there exists a man m such that #_(m) <m #(m) <m #+(m). Then there 
is an element of F, denoted p~ such that pt(m) = p(m), since otherwise (x,n~,(m)>~O) 
is saturated by all the elements of F and not by ~t . 
Condition (1) implies that p" = p+ A (p'V p_)  is in F. So /~_ ~Mla"<~M#+ and 
p"(m) = #(m) but is different from #+(m) and from #_(m), and therefore #_ <M 
/2" <M P+ • 
#" and # are incomparable (by definition of p+(m) and p_(m)). So Pl = #" V # 
satisfies: p <g P2 <M #+- 
#2 is not in F (by definition of p+(m) and p_(m)), #2 saturates all the inequalities 
saturated by all the elements of F (by Lemma 9) and/~_ <g # <g #2 <M #+. 
Repeat he same argument with Pl remplacing/~, to obtain P2 satisfying: 
/A_ <Mf l  <M#I  <M/A2 <MJA+ • 
This construction produces an infinite sequence of distinct stable marriages, contra- 
dicting the fact that there can only be a finite number of marriages. 
(b) p is not in H(p+,#_)  but for all m,/~(m) E {p_(m),/t+(m)}. We are here exactly 
in the situation of the proof of Lemma 11, so by the same arguments (using the sets 
cg~+ cg~_), there is an equation (E) of form (III[m,w]), such that Stow E G(#+,p_), 
that is saturated by all the elements of H(#+,p_)  but is not saturated by p . .  
As in (a), there exists/~' in F not saturating (III[m,w]). #" = #+ A(#tV/~_ ) does not 
saturate (E) either (this can be seen in Fig. 13). Pl =/Z'V/J satisfies p <~t #l <M #+ 
and does not saturate (III[m,w]). 
The proof is completed as in (a). [] 
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Two extreme points of a polytope are said to be neighbors if they form a face of 
dimension 1. 
Corollary 1. #l and #2 are neighbors of the marriage polytope if and only if." 
(1) they are coi'nparable, and 
(2) the graph G(t~+,#-) has only one connected component not reduced to one 
vertex. 
Proof. If #1 and [/2 are not comparable then each face containing them, contains their 
upper and lower bounds. So they cannot be neighbors. Therefore, condition (1) is 
necessary. If G(#+,#_) has nb > 1 connected components not reduced to one vertex, 
then each face containing these marriages, contains 2nb-2 more marriages (the marriages 
of H(p+, #_ )). So, they cannot be neighbors. Therefore condition 2 is necessary. 
The previous theorem shows that the conditions are sufficient. [] 
5. Lattices and faces 
Definition 14. Given a marriage market Ma, its neighborhood graph Gnc is the oriented 
graph defined as follows: 
The vertices u correspond to the stable marriages #. The edges are the ordered pairs 
(su,s~,, ) satisfying: 
(1) p <M /{, 
(2) /~ and //  are neighbors. 
Example. Fig. 14 shows the oriented graph Gnc for the market of Fig. 7. 
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Definition 15. Given two comparable stable man'iages /z_ <At /~+, a sequence of 
edges, Pa, of Gn¢, is a path between/z_ and #+ if it is of the form: 
ea  = { (It_, Itl ), (~1, ,£/2 )...... (Itnb-1, Itnb), (,Unb,/-/4- )}. 
The length of the shortest path 1(#+, #_ ) is defined as follows: 
l(p_,/z+) = min{cardinal of Pa:Pa a path between p_ and It+}. 
Lemma 12. Given two comparable stable marriaoes It- < M lz+, the number of con- 
nected components not reduced to one vertex of G(p_, ~+ ) is l(It_, #+) and all the 
minimal paths are in H(p_, ~+ ). 
Proof. If G is a subgraph of GMa, ncc(G) is defined as the number of connected 
components not reduced to one vertex of G. We know that if a path between p_ and 
/z+, uses only edges from H(/~_, /t+ ), then l(/x_,#+) = ncc(G(it_,/z+)) (by Corollary 
1 ). It must be shown that if a path uses edges not in H(/~_, #+) then it must be longer. 
The proof is by induction on l(Pa). 
(a) l (Pa)= 1. 
Lemma 8 provides the proof. 
(b) The result is assumed true for all Pa with l(Pa) < n. Suppose that there 
exists a path Pao of length n including a stable marriage #0 ~ H(p_,#+) with 
l(Pa) < ncc(G(p-,p+)). Clearly ncc(G(p-,p+)) < nec(G(/x-,it0))+ ncc(G(ito, lZ+)). 
Pao is the union of the two paths, Pa+ between /~+ and/~0 and Pa_ between/z0 and 
#_. So l(Pao) = l(Pa+ ) + l(Pa_). The induction shows l(Pao) = ncc(G(/x-,it0)) +
ncc(G(po, p+)). This is a contradiction. [] 
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Theorem 2. Two marriage markets having the same lattice of stable marriages have 
the same marriage polytopes. 
Proof. By Corollary 1 the two marriage markets have the same neighborhood graph. 
By Lemma 12 the two marriage markets have the same set of hypercubes. So by 
Theorem 1 they have the same set of faces. [] 
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